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ABSTRACT: Research on time and financial transfers is often conducted along two
distinct lines—transfers within the family and transfers beyond the family—without
considering the fact that these transfers are actually interrelated. Using longitudinal
data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), this article investigates the links
between the two groups of transfers. Transfers within and beyond the family were found
to be complements. Income and wealth are strong predictors of financial transfers. Black
and Hispanic families lag systematically in the generosity to help the people both within
and beyond their families.
KEY WORDS: Charitable donation; family transfer; HRS; time and financial transfers;
volunteer work.
Research on time and financial transfers is often conducted along
two distinct lines. In one line, economists and sociologists focus on
transfers within the family, arguing that such transfers are the result
of altruistic preference for family members (Becker, 1974; 1991;
Becker & Tomes, 1986; Caputo, 2002; Loury, 1981; MacDonald & Koh,
2003), or of mutual perceived advantage in transacting or engaging in
joint production by the family members (Pollak, 1985; Williamson,
1979). In the other line, writers on philanthropy and non-profit work
concentrate on the time and financial transfers beyond the family,
studying such phenomena as charitable donations and volunteer work
(Andreoni, Gale, & Scholz, 1996; Bekkers, 2001; Callen, 1994; Carlin,
2001; Jones & Posnett, 1991; Kitchen & Dalton, 1990). With a few
exceptions (e.g. Mulligan, 1997; Schervish & Havens, 2003), the two
lines of research have seldom intersected, leaving researchers on the
transfers within the family taking as exogenous the time and financial
transfers beyond the family, and researchers on philanthropy and
non-profit work treating charitable donations and volunteer work as
isolated decisions unrelated to the within-family transfers.
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Time and financial transfers within and beyond the family are
clearly interrelated, however, for several obvious reasons. First, the
two types of financial transfers and a family’s own consumption add
up, determined by the total financial resources available to each
family. Other things being equal, more within-family financial trans-
fers imply fewer resources available for decisions related to charitable
donations. More charitable donations would shift the budget line in-
ward when making decisions regarding financial transfers to children
or parents. Second, the total amount of time available to each indi-
vidual (and hence, to each family) is fixed. When a family has more
obligations to spend time caring for their children or parents, less time
is available to do volunteer work, and vice versa. In short, the within-
family transfer and the beyond-family transfer seem to be substitutes.
Families do not have the same propensities to give, of course, due to
either differential preferences or heterogeneity or both. Research
shows, for example, that parents differ in their valuation of child well-
being (Nordblom & Ohlsson, 2003), that people with higher income
and level of education are more likely to volunteer (Current Popula-
tion Survey, 2002), that adults who were involved in giving and vol-
unteerism in their youth tend to maintain that involvement in their
adulthood, and that those who belong to religious organizations are
more likely to volunteer and make charitable donations (Independent
Sector, 2001). Thus, if differential propensities to give exist across the
destinations (family and philanthropic organization) of transfers,
those who are more willing to give within the family may also have
high propensities to give beyond the family, suggesting that transfers
within and beyond the family may also act as complements. The exact
relationship between the within-family transfer and the beyond-fam-
ily transfer is therefore likely to be determined by the two compet-
ing—substitution versus complementary—effects.
Understanding the empirical interrelationship between the within-
family and the beyond-family transfers has both important theoretical
and policy implications. Theoretically, by bringing together these
transfers, researchers can help lay ground for any future effort to
unite them in an integrated theoretical model. If the transfers are
indeed strongly correlated, for example, conventional studies on in-
tergenerational transfer or more generally on family behavior, which
take as exogenous any transfers beyond family, need to be expanded.
Practically, empirical evidence on the relationship between the
transfers, which is currently scarce in the literature, may help the
non-profit sector better understand the mechanism of individual
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giving and identify viable and reliable sources to increase the sector’s
sustainability.
In this article I attempt to link the time and financial transfers
within the family to those beyond the family. Specifically, I use panel
data from the Health and Retirement Study 1992–2000 to examine the
potential correlations among all the four types of transfers. The fol-
lowing fundamental issues will be examined: (a) to what extent the
financial transfers within the family influence the financial and time
transfers beyond the family (i.e. charitable donations and volunteer
work); (b) to what extent time transfers within the family influence the
financial and time transfers beyond the family; (c) to what extent
charitable donations influence the financial and time transfers within
the family; and (d) to what extent volunteer work influences the
financial and time transfers within the family. Do the transfers within
the family and beyond the family behave as substitutes or comple-
ments? How do time transfers influence financial transfers—and vice
versa—in a model that integrates all the four types of transfers? Do
the factors influencing the transfers within the family or beyond the
family play the same or similar roles in the model?
The rest of the article is organized as follows. I first review prior
research integrating the transfers within and beyond the family. This
review indicates that previous efforts to link these transfers are very
limited. I then examine the time and financial transfer measures in
the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). Several data quality prob-
lems are discussed and an overall picture of the four types of transfers
is provided. In the next section, I define two levels of cross-transfer
effects (the impact of one type of transfer on another) and estimate the
cross-effects in various regression models. Among the results from
these models, which are summarized in the Conclusion section, are
evidence of complementarities between the transfers within and be-
yond the family, strong household income and asset effects on the
financial transfers, and evidence that minority populations lag sys-
tematically in their generosity in helping the people both within and
beyond the family.
Prior Research Integrating Transfers Within and Beyond
the Family
Research on transfers within the family is generally isolated from
that on transfers beyond the family. When studying the within-family
transfers, for example, researchers often focus on why the transfers
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take place, how the transfers impact on intergenerational transmis-
sion of wealth or status, and how private transfers interact with public
transfers such as social security. Conversely, when examining trans-
fers beyond the family, researchers concentrate on who makes chari-
table donations, who does volunteer work, and what the relationship is
between income (or wealth) and charitable giving. Although signifi-
cant progress has been made in understanding the mechanisms of
both within-family and beyond-family transfers, what is conspicuously
missing in the literature is systematic efforts to integrate the two
groups of transfers.
Among a few studies that do link the two groups of transfers, three
stand out. In a simple model of utility maximization, Auten and Jou-
lfaian (1996) saw an individual’s utility as determined by his or her
own consumption, the wealth or resources of child heirs, lifetime
charitable contributions, and charitable bequests. The beyond-family
transfers were represented in the model by lifetime charitable con-
tributions as well as charitable bequests, whereas the within-family
transfers were represented through the gifts and bequests to children
that were part of children’s wealth or resources. Based on this model
and using matched income tax records for parents and children, they
found that lifetime charitable giving and intergenerational transfers
were substitutes.
A second important study integrating transfers within and beyond
the family was conducted by Mulligan (1997). Extending a general
framework of parental altruism, he brought together the two groups of
transfers in an attempt to understand the impact of altruism on in-
tergenerational mobility and charitable giving. In his models of
transfer behavior, total resources, the value of time, and the interest
rate played important part in forming parental altruism, which in
turn determined not only transfers to children but also voluntary
giving to charities.
The third significant study by Schervish and Havens (2003) linked
the within- and beyond-family transfers. Drawing on their theoretical
and empirical research on wealth and philanthropy, Schervish and
Havens elaborated two directions for understanding transfers to
family and charity. The first direction suggested that identification
with the fate of others was the primary variable explaining transfers
both within and beyond the family. In contrast to the notion in Mul-
ligan (1997) that transfers within and beyond the family were results
of altruism, this argument emphasized that individuals’ caring
behaviors were all motivated by a convergence of interest with the
fates of others along the axis of identification versus isolation. The
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second direction implied that there was a major change in the deci-
sion-making dynamics of transfers when individuals reached a self-
defined level of financial security. According to this argument, when
individuals became very rich, the tradeoffs between self and family,
on the one hand, and charity on the other, were obviated. Conse-
quently, the mechanism of the transfer behaviors was not continuous
across the economic spectrum.
Although there are some studies attempting to integrate transfers
within and beyond the family, current research on the issue is still
very limited. Empirical evidence on the interrelationship between the
two types of transfers is particularly scarce. Even in the studies
linking transfers within and beyond the family, attention is con-
strained to financial transfers; time transfers are rarely examined.
The results from the HRS reported below intend to contribute in this
regard.
Measuring the Time and Financial Transfers in the HRS
The HRS, conducted biennially since 1992, is a national longitudinal
survey of older (50+ years) Americans. Developed to ‘‘provide data for
researchers, policy analysts, and program planners who are making
major policy decisions that affect retirement, health insurance, saving
and economic well-being’’ (Health and Retirement Study, 1999), the
study contains rich information on the income and time trans-
fers—including within-family time and financial transfers—that may
affect individuals’ retirement expectations, attitudes, and opportuni-
ties. It also contains rich information on individual characteristics
that have been found to be significant in influencing a family’s deci-
sions on time and financial transfers. The original HRS sample is used
in this analysis,1 and the observation unit is family household.2
The within-family time transfer in the HRS was measured as an
aggregate of three major components: the hours spent caring for
grandchildren; the hours spent helping parents eat, dress, and bathe;
and the hours spent helping parents with household chores, errands,
and transportation. These components, however, were not measured
consistently across waves. In HRS 1992 and 1994, the time frame for
measuring such transfers was ‘‘the past 12 months.’’ Since HRS 1996,
however, the time frame has been changed to ‘‘since the last interview’’
or ‘‘in the past 2 years.’’ In order to achieve cross-wave comparability, I
converted the measures in HRS 1996–20003 into ones related only to
‘‘the past 12 months.’’ The total time transfer within the family was
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thus defined as total hours spent caring for grandchildren and parents
in the past 12 months.
The ‘‘2 years to 12 months conversion’’ procedure runs as follows.
Let X be the time transfer measure reported for the past 2 years or
since the last interview. Let the number of the months between the
current and last interviews be n. The new, time-frame-adjusted
transfer measure, y, would then be calculated as (12X/n), based on a
simple linear relationship between the quantity of the transfer and the
reference period.4
The within-family financial transfer had two components: financial
assistance given to parents and financial assistance given to children.5
Like the within-family time transfer, these components were mea-
sured inconsistently across waves. They were similarly transformed to
yield 12 month measures. The total financial transfer within the
family was thus defined as total financial assistance given to parents
and children in the past 12 months.
The information about the transfers beyond the family in the HRS
was not as rich as the information about the transfers within the
family. For the financial transfer, each household was first asked
whether it had made at least $500 charitable donations in the past
year, and—if the answer was yes—then how much the donations had
been. For the time transfer, the most relevant measure was the hours
of volunteer work done in the past 12 months for religious, educa-
tional, health-related, or other charitable organizations.
Data Truncation and Cross-Wave Inconsistency
In addition to the different time frames used for measuring the time
and financial transfers within the family mentioned previously, the
transfer measures in the HRS suffered from two other types of data
limitations. First, in most cases, the information on the transfer
variables was truncated, in the sense that it was available only when a
certain threshold was exceeded. If a specific threshold was not met,
then the relevant transfer measure had to be set to zero. This type of
data limitation led to the mean value of the measure being downward
biased.6 Second, when a truncation rule was imposed, the truncation
point was not always the same across waves. The information on the
hours helping grandchildren, for example, was available if a respon-
dent had helped his or her grandchildren more than 50 hours in the
past 12 months in HRS 1994, whereas the same information was
available only if a respondent had helped his or her grandchildren
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more than 100 hours in the past 12 months in HRS 1992. This type of
data limitation produced inconsistent transfer measures.
Although the combined impact of the two types of data limitations
was unknown, it was the second type of data limitation that was likely
to cause more serious problems in the analysis of the transfer data.7
Consequently, I ignored the truncation bias due to the first type of
data limitation and concentrated on the inconsistencies caused by
using different truncation values across waves.
In Table 1, rows A and B document the time frames and truncation
values used for measuring all four types of transfer variables in HRS
1992–2000. Except for the financial transfer beyond the family, which
was measured for the past 12 months and truncated at $500 for all
waves, all other types of transfers had cross-wave inconsistencies. The
aggregate measure of the within-family time transfer in HRS 1992
tended to be downward biased considering that the truncation values
in all the other waves were lower. By the same token, the within-
family financial transfer tended to be downward biased in HRS 1992
but upward biased in HRS 1994, relative to the standards used in HRS
1996–2000. In addition, the time transfers beyond the family in both
HRS 1992 and 1994 were also downward biased.
Table 2, row A summarizes the four types of transfers in the past
12 months in HRS 1992–2000 before corrections. Several points need
to be made about these data. First, as expected, the mean values of the
time transfer beyond the family was significantly downward biased in
both HRS 1992 and 1994, relative to the numbers in the other HRS
waves. With no truncation on the measure in HRS 1996–2000, 40% of
households reported to have done some volunteer work in the past
12 months. When the measure was truncated at 100 hours, as in HRS
1992 and 1994, the percentage was reduced to about 20, suggesting
that only half of the volunteering households had done volunteer work
for 100 hours or more. Second, the mean value of the time transfer
within the family in HRS 1992 seemed also to be downward biased.
Third, the financial transfer beyond the family, the only type of
transfer measured in the same way across waves, seemed to show a
very consistent time-series pattern, with the mean value of the
transfer steadily increasing from $823 in HRS 1992 to $1,298 in HRS
2000.
Correcting for Cross-Wave Consistency
There are two alternative ways to correct the cross-wave inconsis-












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































certain distributional assumptions of each transfer variable, one can
get corrected mean values of the entire sample with no data trunca-
tion. Although the prospect of getting unconditional mean values for
all the transfer variables is tempting, the validity of this approach
critically hinges on the validity of the distributional assumptions.
Second, one may get a consistent measure of each transfer variable
across waves by setting a new, uniform truncation point for the vari-
able in all the waves. Obviously, this approach does not require any
distributional assumptions about the transfers. But because a new
truncation point has to be set as the greatest of all the original trun-
cation points, some of the transfer information has to be thrown away.
In this article, I used the second approach to correct the inconsis-
tencies in the transfer variables. Specifically, I used the truncation
values in HRS 1992 as the base, determining the new truncation
points in other waves according to the time frames used. For the
within-family financial transfer, for example, the new truncation point
was $500 in HRS 1994, when the time frame was ‘‘in the past
12 months,’’ and $1,000 in HRS 1996–2000, when the time frame was
‘‘in the last 2 years’’ or ‘‘since the last interview.’’ Similarly, for the
within-family time transfer, it was 100 hours in HRS 1994, and
200 hours in HRS 1996–2000. Because the financial transfer beyond
the family had already been measured with the same truncation point
in all the waves, no correction was needed for this type of transfer. The
new, adjusted truncation values for each of the transfers are given in
Table 1, row C.
Table 2, row B summarizes the time and financial transfers within
and beyond the family in the past 12 months in HRS 1992–2000 after
corrections. Compared to the results before corrections in row A, all
the measures affected by the correction went in the expected direction:
their mean values went down when the truncation values in HRS 1992
were used as the base. The time series patterns of the transfers, if any,
were stronger and more consistent. Both the time and financial
transfers within the family were declining over the 9 year period
studied. For the time transfer within the family, although the per-
centage of households providing more than 100 hours of family care
remained practically the same between HRS 1992 and 2000, the mean
value of the transfer decreased by about 25%, from 301 hours in HRS
1992 to 227 hours in HRS 2000. In HRS 1992, 40% of the households
provided more than $500 financial assistance to their family members,
with the mean value of the assistance being $2,141. These numbers
were 32% and $1,519, respectively, in HRS 2000.
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By contrast, both types of transfers beyond the family showed a non-
trivial trend of increase. The financial transfer in particular exhibited
a very strong increasing pattern over the HRS 1992–2000 period: The
households donating at least $500 to charities increased from 40% in
HRS 1992 to 45% in HRS 2000, whereas the average donations in-
creased by 57%, from $823 to $1,289. Conversely, the households who
had done more than 100 hours of volunteer work were 18% in HRS
1992, and 20% in HRS 2000. Over the same period, the average hours
of volunteer work increased by about 35%, from 58 to 78.
One immediate consequence of the diverging within and beyond the
family transfer patterns was that the total time transfer, which com-
bined the time transfers within and beyond the family, and the total
financial transfer, which combined the financial transfers within and
beyond the family, showed less salient time series patterns (see Ta-
ble 2, rows C and D). From HRS 1992 to 2000, although the house-
holds who had made at least 100 hours of time transfer either within
or beyond the family increased by about 7%, the mean value of the
transfer decreased by about 8%. Similarly, although the percentage of
households who had made at least $500 of financial transfer either
within or beyond the family remained unchanged, the mean value of
the transfer decreased by about 9%. These results seemed to lead to
the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: Time and financial transfers within and beyond the fam-
ily are substitutes. More time transfer within the family leads to less
time transfer beyond the family, and vice versa. Greater financial
transfer within the family leads to fewer financial transfer beyond the
family, and vice versa.
Hypothesis 2: As people get older, financial transfer within the family
is decreasing, whereas the transfer beyond the family is increasing.
Hypothesis 3: As people get older, time transfer within the family is
decreasing, whereas the transfer beyond the family is increasing.
Cross-Effects in Regression Models
In order to test the validity of the hypotheses, and more generally to
understand the mechanism of the time and financial transfers within
and beyond the family, I estimated a set of simple regression models.
Included in each transfer model were demographic variables (e.g. age,
race/ethnicity, and educational attainment)8, variables representing a
household’s economic and labor market status, and variables repre-
senting the household structure. To capture the effects of other
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transfers on the transfer as the dependent variable (or cross-transfer
effects for short), all three other transfers were also included in the
model.
Two levels of cross-transfer effects were defined. In the first level,
the cross-transfer effect referred to the impact of one type of transfer
on another type across the form of transfer (time or money) or across
the destination of the transfer (within or beyond the family), but not
both. Examples of this included the effect of the within-family time
transfer on the within-family financial transfer, the effect of the
within-family time transfer on the beyond-family time transfer, and
the effect of the beyond-family financial transfer on the beyond-family
time transfer. In the second level, the cross-transfer effect referred to
the impact of one type of transfer on another type across both the form
and the destination of transfer. Examples of this included the effect of
the within-family time transfer on the beyond-family financial trans-
fer, and the effect of the beyond-family time transfer on the within-
family financial transfer. Empirical evidence on the signs or the
magnitude of these cross-effects is scarce. Presumably, strong and
positive cross-effects would suggest that the time and financial
transfers within and beyond the family are complements, whereas
strong and negative cross-effects imply that the transfers are substi-
tutes.
That a household’s economic and labor market status affects its
transfer behavior has been well documented in the literature (An-
dreoni et al., 1996; Becker, 1991; Becker & Tomes, 1986; Dettingger &
Clarkberg, 2002; Lune, Winter, Morris, Gutkowska, & Je _zewska-Zy-
chowicz, 1999; McClelland & Brooks, 2004; Menchik & Weisbrod,
1987). Wealthier parents, for example, are not only more capable of
transferring their assets to their children—in the forms of both human
capital investment and bequest—but also more capable of making
charitable donations. Compared to those who are not very active in the
labor market, individuals who have full-time jobs may have less time
caring for their family members or doing volunteer work.
The variables reflecting a household economic and labor market
status in the transfer models included dummy variables indicating
whether an individual was working, retired, or not in labor market
due to other reasons; total household assets at the time of the inter-
view; total household income in the last calendar year; and a dummy
variable indicating whether any of the household income was labor
income. In accordance with the HRS income and asset definitions
(Health and Retirement Study, 1991), total household assets com-
prised housing equities, real estate, business or farm, individual
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retirement accounts, stocks or mutual funds, certificates of deposit,
bonds, checking or savings accounts, transportation vehicles, and
other assets, minus debts. Total household income was calculated as
the sum of labor income, income from assets, and income from any
other sources defined by the HRS. Labor income included wages or
salary, bonuses, tips or commissions, income from professional prac-
tice or trade, and income from a second job or self-employment.
The variables representing the household structure included the
family size at the time of the 1992 entry to the HRS study, whether the
household were coupled, the number of parents or parents-in-law who
were still alive, the number of children, and the number of siblings.
Supposedly, these variables would capture the effects of differential
needs for—as well as differential abilities to contribute to—the
transfers by family members. The definitions and a summary of all the
independent variables in the models are given in Table 3.
Single Wave Results
Tables 4–7 list the Tobit regression results for the models estimated
separately for each of the HRS data waves from 1992 to 2000. Tobit
models were chosen simply because the transfer measures were all
truncated. Thus, by using Tobit models, a zero value on a transfer
variable was not treated as really no transfer, but as an indication that
the amount of transfer was below a particular threshold. The baseline
variables omitted in the models were ‘‘Other races,’’ ‘‘Non-Hispanic,’’
‘‘School year=16+,’’ and ‘‘Not in labor market—other reasons.’’
A strong education effect was shown in all the four transfer models
and across all the HRS waves. In general, a household headed by a
person with higher educational level tended to spend less time on
family care but provided more financial assistance to the family
members. In addition, a household headed by a person with higher
educational level tended to do more volunteer work and make more
charitable donations. Age played a statistically significant role only in
determining the financial transfers. Older people tended to provide
less financial assistance to their parents and their children but make
more charitable donations.
The race/ethnicity effects were not all statistically significant.
Nevertheless, the overall picture clearly suggested that the house-
holds headed by those who identified themselves as Hispanic tended to
spend less time on family care and volunteer work, and the households
headed by those who identified themselves as Black or Hispanic ten-
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As expected, the household structure was an important determinant
of household transfer behaviors. The bigger a household, the more
time and financial transfers within the family occurred. The greater
the number of living parents (or parents-in-law), the more time and
financial transfers within the family occurred. In addition, a house-
hold with more children tended to spend more time on family care, and
made less charitable donations. All these results suggest that the
within-family transfers were probably needs-driven.
Household transfer behaviors were also influenced by household
members’ labor market status. Compared to others (e.g. homemakers,
TABLE 4













Age 14.0 )6.0 )8.4 )12.7 )7.3
White 424.1* 339.8 141.3 12.2 )31.8
Black )142.7 25.9 )259.4* )355.7 )413.2*
Hispanic )643.1* )522.1** )415.6** )649.3** )585.9**
School year<12 535.3** 328.4** 64.3 50.5 267.8*
School year=12 624.7** 481.3** 212.4** 434.9** 436.0**
School year=13–15 375.1** 194.5 97.0 121.9 293.5**
Family size 123.4** 176.4** 101.8** 214.2** 128.8**
Coupled household 665.4** 456.7** 379.8** 372.5** 349.9**
No. of parents alive 213.9* 527.7** 266.8** 695.8** 581.4**
No. of children 93.5** 37.0* 64.4** 91.9** 59.9**
No. of siblings 19.1 7.1 11.4 31.4* 13.4
Currently working )194.2* )68.0 )97.0 )212.0* )287.5**
Already retired 19.7 313.2** 147.2* 159.0 18.3
HH income ($1,000) )3.5** )2.1** ).9 ).2 ).5
No earnings )208.5* 68.4 )58.0 170.3* )68.6
Asset ($1,000) .08 .07 .02 ).04 .02
Money transfer within the family .01* .01** .02** .02** .01**
Charitable donation .002 ).008 ).020* ).001 .001
Volunteer work .41** .52** .28** .17 .009
Intercept )3922.8** )2526.8** )1295.6** )2356.3 )796.8*
Pseudo R2 .011 .008 .011 .010 .011
Note. No earnings = no labor income in the last year. HRS = Health and Retirement
Study. HH = household.
*p = .05, **p = .01.
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disabled individuals, and those who were unemployed but looking for a
job), people who were currently working tended to spend less time on
family care but provided more financial assistance to family members
and made more charitable donations. By contrast, people who were
already retired tended to make more time and financial transfers both
within and beyond the family.
The asset and income effects were strong in the models predicting
the financial transfers, but trivial in the models predicting the time
transfers. In general, rich or high-income households tended to make
more financial transfers both within and beyond the family. Condi-
TABLE 5













Age )72.5 )162.3** )91.5* )62.8 )45.9
White )629.1 348.3 )284.7 )593.7 )386.1
Black )6392.2** )4552.0** )3837.1** )7039.6** )6987.3**
Hispanic )3141.0** )1363.0 )4200.0** )4855.9** )5196.0**
School year<12 )6750.7** )4495.2** )4374.0** )6902.4** )6355.1*
School year=12 )3687.2** )2208.1** )2310.0** )3294.5** )3478.0**
School year=13–15 )2216.4** )477.4 )1184.1** )2281.1** )1528.8**
Family size 1099.6** 1282.5** 1136.4** 1311.4** 1048.5**
Coupled household )311.7 62.1 )258.6 )1856.9** )22.6**
No. of parents alive 1763.1** 1939.5** 954.4** 2822.5** 1602.0**
No. of children 279.0** 101.9 )88.3 89.6 )2.4**
No. of siblings )149.1* )183.7** )16.5 )77.2 )64.9
Currently working 1941.5** 2093.2** 978.0** 858.0 963.2**
Already retired 2284.6** 2337.9** 1037.0* 2346.3** 1899.3
HH income ($1,000) 37.3** 19.3** 11.4** 25.6** 20.3
No earnings )2741.8** )1533.7** )635.6 )2539.9** )364.4
Asset($1,000) 1.6** 2.0** 1.4** .34** .82
Money transfer within the family .86** .69** 1.4** .79** 1.1**
Charitable donation .21** .41** .25** .21** .11**
Volunteer work 1.5* .61 .46 .64 .30
Intercept )5356.1 )2244.0 )1096.9 )4700.1 )5878.2
Pseudo R2 .020 .024 .022 .026 .021
Note. No earnings = no labor income in the last year. HRS = Health and Retirement
Study. HH = household.
*p = .05, **p = .01.
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tional on income, households with no labor income tended to make
more financial transfers.
Cross-Effects
The correlations between one type of transfer on the other for the
same transfer form or for the same transfer destination were strong,
as indicated in Table 8, which summarizes the 12 possible cross-effects
based on the single wave regression results in Tables 4–7. All eight
Level-1 cross-effects were positive and statistically significant, sug-
TABLE 6













Age 1.0 )6.3 5.6 4.7 1.8
White 148.7 45.1 39.5 9.6 123.2
Black )117.3 )168.5 )40.9 )243.7* )143.7
Hispanic )264.3** )172.7* )205.9** )218.8** )285.5**
School year<12 )482.1** )433.6** )543.9** )594.9** )774.3**
School year=12 )274.4** )243.6** )298.8** )259.2** )402.9**
School year=13–15 )173.1** )86.5* )137.4** )161.3** )223.6**
Family size 28.9* 30.4* 10.4 10.0 4.0
Coupled household 93.5* 87.1* 263.3** 209.1** 339.8**
No. of parents alive )20.6* )73.2* )61.7 54.0** 10.7
No. of children 11.9 12.2* )2.7 5.3** 9.8
No. of siblings 4.2 5.5 13.7* 2.0* 5.0
Currently working )37.1 )7.3 )97.0 )20.1 )16.6
Already retired 35.2 175.9** 147.2 174.4** 130.8*
HH income ($1,000) ).78* ).40** 52.0 .01 ).29
No earnings )33.6* )47.2 72.4 )17.4* 75.6
Asset ($1,000) .02 .02 ).07 ).01 .02
Money transfer within the family .06** .04** .11** .03 .03
Charitable donation .005** .004 .001 .001 ).001
Volunteer work .06** .05** .02** .04** .01**
Intercept )971.9** )448.9** )1101.8** )1182.7** )1169.7**
Pseudo R2 .022 .027 .020 .026 .022
Note. No earnings = no labor income in the last year. HRS = Health and Retirement
Study. HH = household.
*p = .05, ** p = .01.
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gesting that Hypothesis 1 induced from Table 2 was probably not
valid. Alternatively, all four Level-2 cross-effects were zero, indicating
that there was a boundary for one type of transfer to impact another
type of transfer. Another interesting result from Table 8 was that the
cross-effects were symmetric, suggesting that a household probably
made a joint decision on the transfers within the family and beyond
the family, and made a joint decision on the time transfer and the
financial transfer.
TABLE 7













Age 31.9* 62.6** 60.8 53.7* 74.7**
White 574.8 971.0* )78.1 1053.2* 1757.7
Black 44.6 174.3 )621.1 )305.7 )699.5
Hispanic )2038.8** )2292.6** )3836.0** )3404.9** )5388.4**
School year <12 )2618.9** )3143.6** )4278.0** )4424.6** )6980.5*
School year=12 )1437.0** )1952.0** )1750.8** )2620.3** )3947.5**
School year=13–15 )923.1** )1095.6** )937.3** )1552.7** )2047.9**
Family size )4.3 42.6 )81.6 )60.8 )21.5**
Coupled household 1271.1** 1671.8** 2496.3** 1966.1** 3915.8**
No. of parents alive 2.3 121.5 419.7** 327.1** 777.1**
No. of children )79.1** )86.6** )117.6** )50.7** )231.2**
No. of siblings 16.4 30.6 27.2 57.2* 51.3
Currently working 629.5** 1149.5** 1002.6** 593.3* 2096.3**
Already retired 760.2** 662.8** 1173.5** 613.3* 2664.4
HH income ($1,000) 12.9** 2.5** .85 4.7** 14.2
No earnings )834.2** )845.5** )1732.3** )1191.7** )1140.0
Asset ($1,000) .91** .88** 2.1** .43** 1.1
Time transfer within the family .08 ).00 ).37* ).05 .06
Money transfer within the family .02** .06** .20** .04** .22**
Volunteer work 1.8** 3.5** 3.5** 3.0** 4.3**
Intercept )4738.1** )7098.9** )8462.8** )6443.1** 15002.8**
Pseudo R2 .037 .034 .031 .026 .021
Note. No earnings = no labor income in the last year. HRS = Health and Retirement
Study. HH = household.
*p = .05, **p = .01.
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Models With Pooled Data9
Regression results were not very different when the models were
estimated with the HRS 1992–2000 data pooled together (Tables 9 and
10). Several important points need to be emphasized, however.
First, the race/ethnicity effect became more evident than that in the
single wave data models. Other things being equal, the households
headed by those who identified themselves as Black or Hispanic ten-
ded to spend less time on family care, do less volunteer work, provide
less financial assistance to the family members, and make less
charitable donations.
Second, the household structure effects were more evident in the
models predicting the within-family transfers and beyond-family
financial transfer. Moreover, the effects of siblings that were absent in
the single wave data models became statistically significant in all four
transfer models.
Third, two Level-2 cross-effects emerged from the pooled models: the
more the beyond-family time transfer, the more the within-family
financial transfer, and vice versa. One possible explanation for this
effect is that people who spend a lot of time away from the family may
try to compensate family members by providing them with more
money, whereas people who have more family care obligations may try
to fulfill their volunteering work by making more monetary donations.
TABLE 8














Within the family x +* +** 0
Beyond the family +* x 0 +**
Money
Within the family +** 0 x +**
Beyond the family 0 +** +** x
Note. + = positive cross-effect, 0 = no cross-effect, x = not relevant for the cross-effect.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fourth, as in the single wave data models, age was a statistically sig-
nificant factor only in themodelspredicting financial transfers. As people
got older, the financial transfers within the family tended to decrease
over time, whereas the transferbeyondthe family tendedto increase over
time. This finding suggested that Hypothesis 2 induced from Table 2 was
probably valid, whereas Hypothesis 3 was probably not.
Conclusion
The empirical results from the HRS clearly indicate that the time
and financial transfers within and beyond the family are closely
related. The consistently positive and symmetric Level-1 cross-effects
suggest that the transfers within and beyond the family are not sub-
stitutes but complements, in the sense that families that are more
willing to make within-family transfers are also more willing to make
beyond-family transfers, and vice versa. In addition, within the same
transfer destinations, families that are more willing to make time
transfers are also more willing to make financial transfers.
Education plays a significant role in influencing a family’s transfer
behaviors. In general, people with higher educational levels tends to
spend less time on family care but do more volunteer work, provide
more financial assistance to family members, and make more chari-
TABLE 10














Within the family x +** +** 0
Beyond the family +** x +** +**
Money
Within the family +** +** x +**
Beyond the family 0 +** +** x
Note. + = positive cross-effect, 0 = no cross-effect, x = not relevant for the cross-effect.
*p = .05, **p = .01.
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table donations. There are several possible explanations for the strong
education effect on the time transfers within and beyond the family.
First, well-educated people are perhaps more efficient household
producers, so they have more time for outside activities. Second, well-
educated people may be more valuable to non-profit organizations;
demand for their service is higher. Third, well-educated people may be
more knowledgeable about the importance of volunteering work and
about where their expertise can be used.
Other things being equal, Black and Hispanic families tend to spend
less time on family care, do less volunteer work, provide less financial
assistance to the family members, and make fewer charitable dona-
tions. Although contradictory to some studies regarding ethnic dif-
ferences in the propensity to give (e.g. the Twenty-First Century
Foundation, 2003), this finding agrees with many others (e.g. Knapp &
Smith, 1995) and suggests that the minority populations still lag
systematically in the generosity to help the people both within and
beyond their families. Consequently, educating the minority groups
about philanthropy and volunteerism (P&V) may have a great impact
on unleashing new resources in the field of P&V, as realized in some
recent P&V programs (e.g. the W. K. Kellogg Foundation’s
‘‘Unleashing Resources for the Common Good Initiative’’10) that target
those groups.
The family structure, income, and wealth, as well as family mem-
bers’ labor market status are all important factors in a family’s
transfer decisions. It is not surprising that families make more within-
family transfers when needs of family members for such transfers
arise. In the meantime, wealthy families have the ability to provide
more financial assistance to family members and make more chari-
table donations.
Family transfer decisions are probably made jointly as reflected by
the symmetric nature of the cross-effects. To better understand family
transfer behavior, therefore, researchers should not constrain their
studies to either the within-family transfers or the beyond-family
transfers. Instead, they should have a comprehensive model inte-
grating the decisions about both groups of transfers. In this way,
researchers on the transfers within the family may benefit from and
contribute to studies on philanthropy and non-profit work. Members of
the philanthropic community will also have a better understanding of
the nature of giving and volunteerism, which may enhance future
opportunities for such work.
Honggao Cao
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Notes
1. In addition to the original sample, HRS also contains a sister cohort, AHEAD, for
which data collection started in 1993. Further, two more cohorts, War Baby and
CODA, were added to the study starting in 1998. For more information on the
structure of the HRS, see Health and Retirement Study (1999).
2. According to the Current Population Survey (1983), a family household is a
household maintained by a family—which is a group of two persons or more re-
lated by birth, marriage, or adoption—and any unrelated persons who may be
residing there. A HRS household is a family household in the sense that, when a
household has two respondents, they may just be partners. For simplicity, how-
ever, I will only refer to a HRS family household as ‘‘household.’’
3. For those interviewed in both the HRS 1994 and 1996, the actual interview
months were used in making this conversion for the comparable measures in the
HRS 1996. For those who were first interviewed in HRS 1996 or later, I assumed
that the original HRS 1996 measures were about ‘‘the last 2 years’’ or 24 months.
Conversions for the HRS 1998 or 2000 measures were done in the similar way.
4. Because people recall events over a more recent time period better than for a
more distant time period, this strategy may introduce bias to the adjusted mea-
sure. According to Hill (1999), however, a linear relationship between the quan-
tity of the transfer and the reference period may be a reasonable approximation
here.
5. The within-family financial transfer does not include financial assistance to
grandchildren as the information is not available in all the HRS waves studied.
6. Consider a positive transfer measure, Y, which is left-truncated at threshold a.
EðYÞ ¼ PrðY  aÞ  EðYjY  aÞ þ PrðY > aÞ  EðYj > aÞ
 PrðY  aÞ  0þ PrðY > aÞ  EðYj > aÞ:
7. The first type of data limitation, or the data truncation issue, may be resolved
with the help of certain statistical methods such as Tobit models, as discussed in
the section ‘‘Cross-Effects in Regression Model.’’
8. For a two-respondent household, the demographic characteristics were of the
respondent selected according to the following priority rules: (a) original HRS
respondent, (b) the second respondent interviewed, and (c) male. The respondent
chosen in this way will be conveniently called the head of the household.
9. I have also estimated a set of fixed effect models using the pooled data but found
no significant differences in the cross-effect variables.
10. See http://www.wkkf.org.
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